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TRANSITIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
FATE OF DEPOSED DESPOTS
WALTER F. MURPHYt
INTRODUCTION
This Article is taken from a chapter of a book in progress. It is enti-
tled Constitutional Democracy and deals with a bevy of questions that
include: What is constitutional democracy? Why would a people want it
instead of a simpler political system? How do they go about establishing
such a polity? Having established it, how do they maintain it? Moreover,
what limits, if any, are there to how that system can be changed? The
chapter from which this piece is taken addresses questions of constitu-
tional maintenance, such as problems of reconstructing a system of civil
governance after the overthrow of a ruthless regime. The specific ques-
tion confronted here is, what should the leaders of a neonatal constitu-
tional democracy do with the officials of the previous oppressive regime?
The underlying issues are both practical and normative-for power and
duty may not be independent of each other. I try to show some of the
twisted connections among, on the one hand, political power, public out-
rage, and the need for a ravaged society to reconstitute itself with more
than a mere modicum of mutual trust among its citizens, and, on the
other hand, competing conceptions of justice, revenge, and the purposes
of punishment. I argue that justice and prudence do not allow public offi-
cials to center solely on negative policies designed as retaliation for
abuses committed in the past. I stress that leaders must also look to the
future in order to construct positive policies that will enhance the capac-
ity of their citizens to pursue happiness in a civil society.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE PRINCIPAL OPTIONS
In an odd way, the happiest solution for leaders of the new political
order may be that all the former leaders and their chief minions who
abused their subjects escape into exile. That event, of course, is improb-
able. Even if the dictator and his immediate entourage manage to escape,
the hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of people who operated within the
top echelons of the government are not likely to get away. Stay-behinds
pose a serious and difficult problem for the new leaders, especially if
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they face widespread impassioned demands for retributive justice, and
are also truly committed to constitutionalist norms of procedural fairness.
Several options, some of which can be used in combination, are ob-
vious: (1) Through formal decree or inaction, let the ghosts (and the
criminals) of the recent past fade into history; (2) expose the old oppres-
sors to the community's scorn; (3) offer amnesty on condition of full and
public confessions; and (4) initiate criminal prosecutions.
A. Blanket Amnesty and Social Shame
Ex-officials may have forced the first option on the new leaders as
the price of a peaceful surrender of power. It might also happen, as it did
to a great extent in Hungary,' somewhat so in Poland, and more so in the
Russian Federation, that the budding constitutional democracy may de-
cide on its own to ignore former oppressors. The chief security personnel
can be fired (although few KGB were immediately discharged) and of-
fenders left to social sanctions.2 The rationale is that it is more important
to build unity for the future than to wallow in divisive hatred. However
wise such a policy might seem to outside observers, its success would
depend in large part on the willingness of citizens to move on and the
capacity of the leaders of the new governmental system to persuade their
people that this course was the most promising.
Lustration, used as a form of political vetting and social shaming,
offers a second alternative. The term originally referred to the ritual puri-
fication ancient Romans underwent after each census. Christians later
applied it to any sacramental cleansing from sin, such as, for instance,
baptism. 3 Popular for a time in Eastern and Central Europe after 1989,
the policy involved opening the archives of the secret police and allow-
ing information about who had been doing what to whom to become
public knowledge. The objective was not merely to shame people who
had helped the secret police, but, more broadly, to facilitate ousting
communist functionaries, devout or hypercritical, from administrative
posts and to allow voters to reject electoral candidates who had collabo-
rated with the old regime.4
1. See Gdbor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Living Well Is the Best Revenge: The Hungar-
ian Approach to Judging the Past, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 155, 160 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997).
2. Indeed, it has been reported that under President Vladimir Putin, "The security services
have swelled and their alumni are now filling government posts at all levels." Putin Power, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 15. Additionally, "Russian democracy is a cynical joke." Id.
3. Before the 1990s, lustration had probably become more common in discussions of witch-
craft than in moral theology or politics, a usage not too far removed from what would be experienced
in Central and Eastern Europe.
4. See Herman Schwartz, Lustration in Eastern Europe, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 461, 461 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995);
Andrzej Rzeplinski, A Lesser Evil?, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 33, 33 (Fall 1992).
[Vol. 81:2
DEALING WITH DEPOSED DESPOTS
In Poland, the former East Germany, and the Czech and Slovak Re-
public, lustration's results were scattered, exposing not only many in-
vidious acts and actors but also producing much social and political
chaos. Husbands and wives, for instance, discovered their mates had
spied on them, and patients learned about their doctors.5 In addition,
leaders of the resistance, even Vdclav Havel and Lech Walesa,6 were
accused of having collaborated with the secret police. Part of the confu-
sion occurred because the former regimes, with totalitarian aspirations,
had no respect for marriage or the doctor-patient relationship. Another
cause of confusion was simpler: much of the information in the govern-
ment's files was bogus. Secret agents must constantly prove they are
diligent; reporting contacts with and rumors from fictional informants
shows diligence; and security officials are seldom troubled by qualms of
conscience in falsifying records to further their own careers.
Making matters worse, some people striving for power during the
transitional period were quite ready to use falsified data to ruin competi-
tors. As a result, lustration soon lost its luster. The German government
quickly restricted access to the Stasi's files. Besides, after the first post
re-unification election, most East Germans who had meaningful ties with
the old regime dropped out of politics, either voluntarily or because of
imprisonment, defeat at the polls, or having been fired. The Czechs al-
lowed their lustration law to lapse, and the Polish constitutional court
declared their law unconstitutional as a violation of the basic concepts of
"a democratic state ruled by law" and "human dignity" as well as the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.1
B. Conditional Amnesty
Conditional amnesty offers a third alternative, one that can partake
both of amnesty's remission of physical punishment and lustration's pub-
lic shaming. At least seventeen countries, including Argentina and Chile,
have set up truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) to find out ex-
actly what happened during their periods of authoritarian rule. Some,
perhaps most, of these have been rather feeble, little more than fact-
finding bodies, lacking authority to compel witnesses to appear and tes-
5. This kind of informing on relatives, clients, and even parishioners was hardly a commu-
nist creation. In Czarist Russia, the secret police "turned" some Orthodox priests, persuading them to
report any politically dangerous acts they heard under the seal of the confessional.
6. See Wiktor Osiatynski, Agent Walesa?, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 28, 28-29 (Summer
1992).
7. After this decision, the Polish parliament watered down the statute. See Andrzej S.
Walicki, Transitional Justice and the Political Struggles of Post-Communist Poland, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 185, 198 (A. James
McAdams ed., 1997); see also generally Jacek Kurczewski, The Rule of Law in Poland, in THE
RULE OF LAW IN CENTRAL EUROPE: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEGALITY, CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 181 (Jiif Ptibsll & James Young eds.,
1999) (discussing what legal problems were faced and how they were dealt with by post-communist
Poland law).
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tify under oath. South Africa provides the most famous example of a
vigorous TRC. It invited victims and their relatives to tell their stories
and, if they could, identify their tormentors. This TRC was authorized to
offer amnesty to people implicated either by this testimony or the inde-
pendent investigations of its own staff. Suspects included both officials
who had allegedly used heinous methods to maintain apartheid, and pri-
vate citizens, who were mostly members of the African National Con-
gress, believed to have committed crimes during its struggle with other
black groups to control the campaign against apartheid. If not satisfied
with the testimony of supplicants for amnesty, the Commission could,
and did, recommend criminal prosecution in more than a hundred in-
stances. 8 Essentially, the TRC required those seeking absolution to meet
three basic conditions: to confess their offenses fully, honestly, and pub-
licly; to demonstrate that they had committed these crimes for political
rather than personal reasons; and to submit to cross-examination by
prosecutors, members of the Commission, and victims or their relatives.
The Commission then judged each petition on its individual merits.
Both the immunity from prosecution that leaders of outgoing au-
thoritarian regimes negotiate for themselves, and the immunity that a
truth and reconciliation commission offers raise grave moral problems.
Do such agreements and procedures violate fundamental norms of jus-
tice? The implications of such issues are also practical for a new consti-
tutional democracy, generating serious questions about the new polity's
commitment to the values it claims to further. The following sections of
this chapter grope with these civic and moral difficulties.
Several other issues carry moral implications but are essentially
practical in nature. In the short run, to what extent can such a commis-
sion produce truth, and what can be accepted as truth? It is unlikely that a
report, produced as it must be if it is to serve as a catalyst for change
soon after the collapse of the old regime, can constitute a definitive his-
torical analysis. Lurking in the shadows is a more basic question: Will
knowing the truth, assuming the Commission can produce the truth, lead
to reconciliation? "You shall know the truth," the author of John's Gos-
pel asserts, "and the truth will set you free." The Indo-European root of
the word "free" is the same as "to love."9 If we understand "free" in this
broader sense, it would include release from hate, from a desire for
vengeance, impregnating the words John reported with heavy political
and theological cargo. Indeed, a modest version of this broader concep-
8. Among the more notable instances were the TRC's refusal to absolve Eugene de Kock,
one of the most sadistic leaders of a security force not noted for tender regard for due process, and
the five policemen implicated in the murder of Steve Bilko. Although de Kock was convicted,
prosecutors dropped the charges against the five police because of insufficient evidence.
9. ERIC PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH
235 (2nd ed. 1959); see THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 375-76 (C.T. Onions
ed., 1966) (stating that the primary sense of "free" in old German is "dear").
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tion must underlie such commissions. Empirical evidence for such ef-
fects is, however, less than virile.
To have a politically meaningful effect, the report of a TRC cannot
merely target dispassionate and disinterested scholars who are open to
persuasion about the sins and virtues of the immediate past. Rather, that
message would have to reach, and persuade, two audiences, who if not
deaf, are apt to be "hearing impaired." First would be those people, quite
possibly a rather large number, who during the period of authoritarian
rule had enjoyed moderately happy lives, having chosen, in exchange for
the government's leaving them alone, to accept their own loss of liberty
and ignore the suffering of others. A TRC would have to convince these
quietists to peep outside their private shells, recognize the evils of the old
regime, and support fundamental political change. An additional audi-
ence that might be trickier to persuade would be those people and the
families of those people who had been imprisoned, tortured, or mur-
dered.' 0 They would need no convincing about the old system's evils or
the need for change, but might well be cynical about the necessity of
following the norms of constitutional democracy, both in dealing with
offenders and in re-crafting the constitutional order.
Embedded here is the problem of how much truth, with or without
love, people really want. Each of us has a self-image that only partly
corresponds to reality. The gift the giver might give us is not one that
most of us crave, nor are we likely to allow others the full truth about
ourselves-precisely why Justice Louis D. Brandeis called the right to be
let alone, or privacy, "the right most valued by civilized men."' So, too,
every ethnic group and every nation has its self-serving myths, founding
and continuing, stories that may be true, false, or synthesize both fact and
fiction. Only if the past can be accepted for what it is, a saga of mixed
themes, some cause for pride, others for shame, can "the truth" facilitate
political reconciliation. The truth that matters, Michael Ignatieff says, is
"interpretive truth," the past as refracted through one's personal and
group myths, a truth that only insiders can grasp, not the factual truth that
an investigatory commission might, if its members are dispassionate and
skilled, produce.
12
The French Revolution was not the only radical change of regimes
that produced a reign of terror. "Now it's our turn!" is a very human re-
10. Ideally, that message should also reach at least some of the people who profited from the
old constitutional order. Complete acceptance, however, would be beyond reasonable hope. Officials
and families of officials of authoritarian regimes have not been noted, at least not for very long, for
living in monastic simplicity, and it is improbable that they could be persuaded by reason alone not
only to surrender the power, money, and prestige of their official positions but also to accept guilt
for assorted felonies.
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN
CONSCIENCE 175 (1998).
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action. It is little short of remarkable that this sort of murderous orgy did
not occur after the end of apartheid in South Africa. Much of the peace-
ful nature of the exchange of power is due to Nelson Mandela and
Archbishop Desmond Tutu's persuading their followers to work for the
future rather than avenge the past. The TRC played an active role during
the later stages of this peaceful transition, but its impact is disputed. Af-
ter conducting a large survey in 2000-2001 regarding public reactions to
the TRC's work, James L. Gibson concluded that the process contributed
to acceptance among whites, coloreds, and Asians of the ugly truth about
apartheid. 13 Even though three times as many blacks as whites said they
placed confidence in the TRC's findings, Gibson found "no clear evi-
dence" that the TRC had shaped blacks' views about apartheid. 14 Most
likely, they had no need for further instruction in the evils of the old or-
der. More importantly, however, interracial trust remained low. A Niel-
sen survey taken in 1998, while the Commission's work was still in pro-
gress, reported that two-thirds of those asked believed that the TRC's
investigations led to a deterioration of race relations. 15 After publication
of the final report, Gibson found that a majority of whites still believed
blacks were likely to commit crimes and forty-one percent of blacks be-
lieved whites were likely to do so; one-third of whites thought blacks
were untrustworthy, and about one-fifth of blacks deemed whites deserv-
ing of trust.16 Standing alone, these data do not indicate that the TRC
furthered reconciliation, at least in the short run, 17 a result that should not
have come as a shock. In the United States, bitter memories among
southern whites about Reconstruction lingered well into the twentieth
century, and African Americans' folk memory of slavery and Jim Crow
remains sharply alive in the twenty-first century.
The question of whether to establish a TRC cannot be intelligently
decided by looking only at these commissions. It is crucial to judge their
likely effectiveness in comparison with that of alternative institutions and
processes. Martha Minow argues that a truth commission's exposure of
atrocities can be more effective than criminal prosecutions in bringing
people together.18 She offers no hard evidence to support her argument
13. See generally JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A
DIVIDED NATION? (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).
14. Id.
15. See Robert 1. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Rec-
onciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 3, 19 (Robert I. Rotberg
& Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
16. GIBSON, supra note 13; see also JAMES L. GIBSON & AMANDA GouwS, OVERCOMING
INTOLERANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC PERSUASION 15-38 (2003).
17. The South African government's decision to pay $3,900 to the family of each victim of
apartheid who testified, or whose family testified before the TRC, may or may not have furthered
reconciliation. Although the average income of a black family there was only $3,000, some critics
attacked the amount as paltry and insulting to the victims. Ginger Thompson, South Africa to Pay
$3,900 to Each Family of Apartheid Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at A7.
18. See Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in TRUTH
V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 235, 235-36 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis
[Vol. 81:2
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for South Africa or any other nation. In any event, after analyzing re-
spondents' answers to his survey, Gibson concludes that the Commission
made important contributions toward creating a civil society in South
Africa.' 9 If his insights, gained from much time and research in South
Africa, point toward this conclusion, his data do not offer muscular sup-
port for it.
As in much analysis of political causation, reasoning post hoc,
propter hoc is a present, if not always clear, danger, as is the difficulty of
unsnarling the many threads that have tangled together to create a multi-
causal effect. The problem is one of multicollinearity: South Africa's
most respected leaders urged forgiveness; the chief revolutionary party,
the African National Congress, was tainted with the blood of rival black
organizations; people were tired of a long, seemingly escalating, guerrilla
war; and the new government did not rely exclusively on the Commis-
sion but also prosecuted some of the worst offenders.
The most positive assessment one can confidently make is that, as
the white supremacist regime was collapsing, it had not been clear that
the new republic would avoid civil war and the sort of brutal dictatorship
that had taken over most Sub-Saharan countries. In this precarious con-
text, the TRC carried out its mandate fairly and spread what its members
deemed to be the truth about an ugly past, excoriating some leaders of
the African National Congress (which probably angered many blacks)
along with white rulers and their minions (which probably angered many
whites). The Commission tried to lay the base for a political culture that
values human rights and recognizes the importance of due process of law
in protecting those rights. This mission is of critical importance for a
constitutional democracy that will endure. Most obviously, it is likely
that the decision of a government, dominated by black survivors of
apartheid, to choose magnanimity over revenge, taught whites, blacks,
coloreds, and Asians something about the prudence of forgiveness. That
decision certainly enhanced South Africa's status as a responsible nation
with powerful ambitions to become a constitutional democracy.
Despite Gibson's excellent empirical work, we still have only a se-
ries of shrewd but conflicting guesses. Against Martha Minow's claim
that full and open confessions elicited by a TRC are more healing than
punishment inflicted by the criminal law, we have Hannah Arendt's as-
sertion that human beings cannot forgive what they cannot punish.2°
Supporting data for either claim are sparse. Neither forgiveness nor am-
nesia, however, is necessary for reconciliation. If either were, healing
would be impossible. Great Christians, like Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
Thompson eds., 2000); see also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
19. GIBSON, supra note 13.
20. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 241 (1958).
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may be able to forgive and urge others to join them, but some Christian
moral theologians understand that forgetting wrongs is impossible.
21
What is necessary for reconciliation is a willingness to put aside hatred
for a particular sector of the population. That is, black South Africans
could continue to despise Afrikaner leaders such as Daniel Malan, John
Vorster, Frederick W. de Klerk, and certainly Eugene de Kock; Ulster
Catholics to revile Ian Paisley (and, having notoriously long memories,
Oliver Cromwell); Jews who returned to Germany to detest Hitler and
Himmler; Palestinians to hate Ariel Sharon, Benjamin Netanyahu, and all
Mosad agents; and Israelis to revile Yasir Arafat and all members of
Hamas and Hizbollah. Yet, if these people were not willing to try to ac-
cept whites, Protestants, Germans, Jews, and Arabs as fellow citizens,
civil governance would be impossible in such multiethnic societies.
C. Criminal Prosecutions
The extent to which the success of South Africa's TRC (if it really
was a success) could be duplicated elsewhere is problematic. Without
doubt, the appearance of a leader with the political skill, charisma, and
righteous forbearance of Nelson Mandela is not a frequent happening.
Furthermore, it may be that new leaders do not, as a practical matter,
have the option of pretending to absolve offenders after they suffer only
the humiliation that comes from public confessions.22 Demands for re-
tributive justice, often difficult to differentiate from plain old-fashioned
revenge, may echo so loudly throughout the community so as to force the
government to take more punitive action. This means choosing a fourth
option: criminal prosecution. That course, however, does not necessarily
offer a series of surgical strikes unless leaders can create crystalline dis-
tinctions both among state-sanctioned crimes and degrees of guilt. Even
in "normal" criminal prosecutions, distinctions between felonies and
misdemeanors are sometimes arbitrary. Where we deal with mass felo-
nies committed by public officials, emotions are likely to bubble over,
and the number of both victims and tormentors may be huge.
In the People's Republic of Germany, for example, the Stasi di-
rectly employed almost 100,000 men and women and, indirectly, perhaps
23as many as a quarter of a million more. Even those numbers, however,
seem tiny when we recall that the Hutus in Rwanda hacked to death
21. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, A BETTER HOPE: RESOURCES FOR A CHURCH CONFRONTING
CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND POSTMODERNITY 139-54 (2000). I should note a distinction here:
morality is concerned with the duties that human beings owe to each other; moral theology focuses
on these mutual obligations as derived from the duties that humans owe to the Deity.
22. Of course, offenders may experience no remorse for their crimes on behalf of the old
constitutional order and thus suffer no humiliation. Indeed, their admissions may gain them a certain
6clat within their reference group.
23. The figure of "official" Stasi employees was 97,000, with an additional 150,000 "unoffi-
cial collaborators." See JENNIFER A. YODER, FROM EAST GERMANS TO GERMANS?: THE NEW
POSTCOMMUNIST ELITES 97 (1999).
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about 800,000 Tutsis, and the government later arrested more than
120,000 alleged genocidaires. Exempting clerks and secretaries from
legal sanctions may be easy, but deciding whom to punish at operational
and command levels is far more difficult. Should, for instance, Rwanda
have limited prosecution to the chiefs who urged their people to commit
mayhem, or was it proper to include those who did the bloody chop-
ping?24 In Latin America and the former Soviet satellites, should the new
governments have prosecuted only the senior officials who ordered mur-
der and torture, or included those who shot prisoners, tore out fingernails,
crushed testicles, or participated in gang rapes? Should the new leaders
also have tried police who did the arresting and jailers who kept the vic-
tims imprisoned? In addition, what about informers, especially paid in-
formers, without whose perfidy prisoners might not have been arrested at
all?
Furthermore, serious questions of ex post facto laws may arise.
Some of the most brutal acts of security officials were probably not
criminal under the laws of the old regime, or shielded by statutes of limi-
tations. Hungary's new government met this situation by criminalizing
the more oppressive acts committed by officials of the old regime and
amending statutes of limitations for acts that had been criminal. In 1992,
however, the Hungarian constitutional court invalidated these efforts. 25 It
may well be that security officials violated international law, but the
reach of such law might raise difficult questions of applicability if the old
government had not been party to relevant international agreements re-
garding human rights.26
24. Faced with such an enormous burden of investigating and trying so many accused, the
Rwandan government established a series of very informal tribunals called Gacca courts (gacca
means piece of grass), which sat in the open near a village, so that all people in the area could attend
and, if they wished, give evidence. These proceedings partook of the atmosphere of "both the Salem
witch trials and a Mississippi Christian revival." Samantha Power, Rwanda: The Two Faces of
Justice, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 16, 2003, at 1. The proceedings of the Gacca courts also bore
some resemblance to the grand jury in late medieval England in that they officially accused many of
the defendants. The Hutus complained that they were getting victors' justice. Eventually the gov-
ernment freed about 80,000 of the accused without trials.
25. Alajos Dombach, Retroactivity Law Overturned in Hungary, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 7, 8
(Spring 1992); see also Halmai & Scheppele, supra note 1, at 160. The United States Supreme
Court, though only by a 5-4 vote, also held that extending a statute of limitations to punish an al-
leged sex offender against whom the original limitations had already run, violated the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2452 (2003). For the
majority, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote: "[T]o resurrect a prosecution after the relevant statute of
limitations has expired is to eliminate a currently existing conclusive presumption forbidding prose-
cution, and thereby to permit conviction on a quantum of evidence where that quantum, at the time
the new law is enacted, would have been legally insufficient." Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2452. Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 2461.
26. It remains a legal possibility, though a politically remote one, that some officials, both of
the old South African government and of the African National Congress, could be prosecuted, at
least outside of South Africa. The new constitutional text forbids conviction for "an act or omission
that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time it was committed or
omitted .... " S. AFR. CONST. ch. 11, § 35(3)(1). Many of the acts to which people confessed before
the TRC may have been, at the time of commission, offenses against international law. See John
Dugard, Retrospective Justice: International Law and the South African Model, in TRANSITIONAL
2003]
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It may also be difficult to find prosecutors and judges with clean
hands. Many of these officials may have been intimately linked to op-
pression. Fresh judicial personnel might soon be in place; but they, hav-
ing possibly been victims or relatives of victims of the authoritarian re-
gime, might appear to be less than disinterested. This problem is not triv-
ial if the new government is trying to teach its citizens the norms of con-
stitutional democracy. Thus, if leaders choose criminal prosecution, they
may wish to ask for the help of the UN, or utilize some other interna-
tional arrangement for a tribunal to try political offenses.27 In 1993, the
UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, providing a forum in which to try leaders of all
sides for atrocities committed before and during the civil wars in Bosnia
and Kosovo.28 Slobodan Milosevic, sometime president of Serbia, was
the most notorious defendant to grace that court's docket. A similar reso-
lution created a tribunal to try people accused of genocide in Rwanda. To
maintain an aura of objectivity, the judges sat in Tanzania. The perma-
nent establishment of the International Criminal Court, located at the
Hague and associated with, but not part of, the UN, offers a forum to
prosecute former officials accused of violating human rights and to do so
without the aroma of victors' justice and with less danger of exacerbating
ethnic hatreds.
II. FAIRNESS, VENGEANCE, AND PRUDENCE
Any compromise that includes amnesty for the military, secret po-
lice, and/or civilian autocrats of the old regime will sit bitterly in the
mouths of victims and their families. These people are apt to believe it is
dreadfully wrong that their oppressors not stand trial for their crimes.
Nevertheless, before public officials can bring a criminal action, they
must have the will, power, and authority to do so. In Poland and Hun-
gary, for example, the new governments had the two latter but chose to
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 269, 273 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997).
For a more complete analysis of the international law relevant here, see Diane F. Orentlicher, Set-
tling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J.
2537, 2551-2612 (1991).
27. Belgian law allows prosecution of crimes against humanity in Belgian courts, no matter in
which venue the acts were committed. Early in 2003, Belgium narrowed its code to allow such
prosecutions by non-Belgians only where they themselves were directly injured. Later in 2003, the
Belgian prime minister announced that his government would amend the law to allow only Belgians
to file suit. The law now permits prosecutors to transfer cases to the International Criminal Court in
the Hague. During the summer of 2003, Belgian courts threw out private suits against Israeli Prime
Minister Aial Sharon and General Amos Yaron, as well as against George W. Bush and General
Tommy Franks. See Too Embarrassing: Why Belgium Is Changing Its Law Against Genocide, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 2003, at 43. American courts have civil jurisdiction over offenses under inter-
national law, though even if successful, litigants are not likely to collect from defendants.
28. The official title is "The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991." For an analysis of the UN Security Council's efforts to establish such
courts under Article 41 of the UN Charter, see Faiza Patel King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia
Tribunal's Development of Limits on the Security Council's Powers Under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 509 (1996).
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be carefully selective in their prosecutions, relying more heavily on what
Eric Lincoln calls "no-fault reconciliation. 29
In other situations, new leaders may have the will and authority, but
lack the power to impose punishment. It is probable, for instance, that the
Uruguayan army would have resumed military rule had the civilians tried
to repeal the amnesty the junta had conferred on itself and its subordi-
nates before yielding power.3 ° In 1984, Argentina's civilian government
under President Radil Alfonsfn repealed this grant of amnesty and began
to bring army officers as well as commanders of leftist guerrillas to trial
for assorted violations of human rights. Several legal obstacles immedi-
ately arose. One was an existing statutory requirement that trials of mili-
tary personnel begin in military tribunals, whose officers were not anx-
ious to try their brothers. The other was the doctrine of "due obedi-
ence"-the obligation of junior officers to presume the legitimacy of
orders from senior officers.
Eventually, the government was able to convict some of the princi-
pals in the "Dirty War," including Galtieri, though for malfeasance in
conducting the so-called Malvinas War against Britain rather than for
kidnapping, torture, and murder. It soon became evident, however, that
the civilian government's control of the military was shaky, and prosecu-
tions stopped after several outbreaks of mutiny. In 1989, President Carlos
Menem, Alfonsfn's successor and a member of the Per6nista party, an
organization that had launched a goodly share of Argentina's military
coups, pardoned all those who had been convicted. 3' Fourteen years later,
more prosecutions became possible when the legislature again repealed
previous grants of amnesty. Yet it was Spanish rather than local prosecu-
tors who moved first, and Argentina's President Nestor Kirchner, who
had himself briefly been one of the junta's guests, nullified an earlier
decree that had forbidden extradition of military personnel.
In Chile, the new civilian government was less willing and no more
able to bring Pinochet's pack to trial. Initially, the General's retaining
both his military status and the loyalty of a large portion of his troops
gave him de facto immunity. During the early stages of the common law,
no writ could run against the king because he supposedly controlled the
physical force of the realm. For the same reason, no writ can run against
29. C. ERIC LINCOLN, COMING THROUGH THE FIRE: SURVIVING RACE AND PLACE IN
AMERICA 157 (1996).
30. This grant was later confirmed by a public referendum. Apparently, the Uruguayans
understood the price to be paid for return to civilian rule.
31. Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The
Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2621 (1991). Because of the pardon, Galtieri, noted more
for his overindulgence in alcohol than for his intellectual power, served only five of the twelve years
of his sentence. Some years later, police placed him under house arrest while the courts adjudicated a
claim that the grant of amnesty for his participation in numerous murders was unconstitutional. He
died in 2003, before the issue was settled. See Obituary: Leopoldo Galtieri, THE ECONOMIST, Jan.
18, 2003.
2003]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a modern general who commands an army ready to protect him. In 2001,
when Spain tried to extradite Pinochet from Britain, where he was seek-
ing medical treatment, to try him for murdering Spanish citizens, the
Chilean government claimed that its own tribunals should mete out
whatever punishment was due. After winning in British courts, however,
Chilean officials continued to let sleeping generals lie.32 In 2003, the
civilian government announced plans to try several dozen of the junta's
security officials. Even then, however, prosecutors were apparently plan-
ning to let the top echelon of the old regime alone, in part out of fear of
the army's reaction and in part out of a desire not to pick at the scabs of
healing wounds.
The practical issues surrounding decisions to prosecute are hardly
simple, but the moral issues are even more tangled, as the following sec-
tion of this Article indicates. These events and nonevents, like the condi-
tional amnesty offered by TRCs that follow the strong model of South
Africa, raise grave questions about the relationships among punishment,
justice, and constitutionalist values. 33 Beyond stirring deep anger, immu-
nity raises issues of equality before the law and the commitment of the
new constitutional order to this ideal. It would not be unreasonable for a
people new to constitutional democracy to harbor suspicions of hypoc-
risy were the government to imprison a man who, while drunk, assaulted
another patron in a barroom brawl and yet refuse to prosecute men who
had ordered the murder of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of political dis-
sidents.
It is certain, however, that if the ghouls who dominated the old re-
gime believe surrendering power will lead them straight to the gibbet,
they will have a huge incentive to fight with all their resources. More-
32. In 2000, Chile's highest court had removed the General's immunity and ordered him to
stand trial for murder. A year later, the case was dismissed on grounds that Pinochet was mentally
incompetent to stand trial. In addition to having diabetes, he had suffered several strokes and was
experiencing difficulty walking. Nevertheless, in 2003, he gave a talk at a meeting of retired gener-
als, and various human rights groups went to court arguing that the General was now mentally com-
petent to stand trial on other charges of murder and should be stripped of the immunity. The court of
appeals dismissed the case.
33. Those questions may seem more serious in some countries than in others. Pardons are part
of every system of law, but immunity from prosecution differs from system to system. Americans
are accustomed to reading about bargains in which prosecutors and accused criminals swap guilty
pleas on lesser charges for shorter prison terms. Sometimes, prosecutors even offer complete am-
nesty to major felons in exchange for help in convicting their bosses. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 16 (2003); JULIA RONDA,
PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1995). On the other hand, the
civil law denies the legitimacy of such negotiations. Procurators and judges prefer to pretend that
they even-handedly enforce the black letter of the law. It is, therefore, not at all unlikely that an
agreement not to prosecute the predators who ran the old regime would incite even greater anger in
countries in which the official legal myth denied plea bargaining. But see Abraham S. Goldstein &
Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy,
and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) (claiming that prosecutorial discretion in these three civil
law countries differed more in candor than in fact from that in the United States. Their article trig-
gered a long debate.).
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over, an internal war is likely to cause heavy casualties among civilians.
Such a conflict may not be the greatest evil that can befall a people; in
fact, it may affect much good, as for instance, freeing slaves or releasing
an entire people from political bondage. Yet, whatever their positive re-
sults, civil wars are always savagely divisive. They may begin as binary
battles over principle, but they often mutate into conflicts among tribes
or even within neighborhoods, involving jealousy, greed, and alleged
personal insults, fueling hatreds that can endure for generations.34 In
short, a civil war can do to a nation what cross-cut shredders did to En-
ron's ledgers. Thus, leaders who recall the free-falls into near anarchy
and oppression that occurred in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chechnya,
Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, and
Zaire must discount the enormity of these evils by their probability-
which is a matter of practical judgment.
Additionally, there may be serious doubt as to who would win a
civil war. Authoritarian governments may teeter without falling, as illus-
trated by failed revolts in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968,
and the tragic fate of China's Democracy Movement in 1989. Each pro-
duced its share of corpses without yielding either democracy or constitu-
tionalism. 35 For all the frustration amnesty generates, following Hunting-
ton's advice may be the price of avoiding butchery: "[D]o not prosecute,
do not punish, do not forgive, and, above all, do not forget.,
36
Whether frightened tyrants will begin a civil war is also a matter for
practical judgment for them as well as for the leaders of a movement for
constitutional democracy. The old elite may choose instead to run, a pos-
sibility that fogs decisions. As Justice Brandeis once wrote, the "great
difficulty of all group action . . . is when and what concession to
make., 37 Seldom is the choice between a clear good and a clear evil.
Typically, it is between evils, when doing nothing will itself produce
evil. "Every decision of consequence," Hilaire Belloc said, "has grave
evils attached to it-or grave risk of evil. 38 Multiplying that difficulty is
the fact that leaders frequently must make critically important judgments
under conditions of uncertainty, sometimes extreme uncertainty. They
34. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Ontology of "Political Violence": Action and Identity in Civil
Wars, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 475, 475 (2003) (arguing that "[clivil wars are not binary conflicts, but
complex and ambiguous processes that foster" an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identi-
ties and actions).
35. On the other hand, one might contend that, although the Hungarian and Czechoslovak
uprisings immediately produced only bloody repression, the anger they revealed soon moved offi-
cials, especially in Hungary, to modify the harshness of their rule. What effect, if any, China's De-
mocracy Movement had still remains to be seen a decade and a half later.
36. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 231 (1991).
37. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 18
(1957) (internal citations omitted).
38. Letter from Hilaire Belloc to Lady Lovat (Aug. 8, 1930), in LETTERS FROM HILAIRE
BELLOC 214, 215 (Robert Speaight ed., 1958).
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cannot be sure of the effects of their choices or the reactions of oppo-
nents or even allies. Nor can they be certain that what they perceive as
the range of possibilities is not skewed by their own political myopia.
Thus, they may be obliged to select among partially informed guesses
about the relative probability that a particular course, rather than any of
several others, will guide their country to what is good. Being forced to
choose between tolerating what seems to be a smaller evil to avoid what
seems to be a much larger evil-and to hope, but not be certain, that their
decision will yield the least evil-is itself one of the costs leaders must
pay for having fallible judgment and blurred visions of the future.
In such situations, hurling moral blame may itself be morally reck-
less. It would take large globs of information about evil goals and ig-
nored information-in short, convincing evidence of criminal stupidity,
criminal negligence, or criminal purposes-to confidently brand as mor-
ally wrong a decision to exchange amnesty for a peaceful exit. Philoso-
phers in the safety of their proverbial armchairs may deem a civil war's
cost in human lives to be irrelevant to questions of abstract justice, but
that price cannot be irrelevant to public officials who are responsible for
those lives. Leaders of the new constitutional order could shout, "Fiat
justitia, ruat coelum!" That cry, however, is more likely to send souls to
hell ahead of schedule than to bring peace on earth or cause the heavens
to tumble. If the best judgment of the leaders of the new constitutional
order sees the options as civil war or amnesty, then the pleasure of in-
flicting on tyrants the punishment they have earned will have to take
second place to saving lives. In any event, the new leaders will have a
massive task convincing the new citizens that their choice among public
policies was the best possible under the circumstances.39
The situation the new constitutional order faces when it considers
establishing a commission of truth and reconciliation may be quite dif-
ferent from that which existed before the old regime surrendered
power.4n (In South Africa, the apartheid government apparently insisted
on such a procedure as a condition of peaceful exit from office.) Al-
though civil war might well remain a possibility when the government's
authority, if not all of its power, has moved into the hands of the new
leaders, open warfare is not as likely to occur, and if it does, it is less
39. One palliative on which new leaders can insist is the restriction of amnesty to past acts.
These pacts should not extend any immunity beyond the date of the agreement, lest the old leaders,
as they exit from power, continue to commit criminal deeds. Absolution for past felonies should not
become license for future crimes.
40. There are also tricky procedural issues. John Dugard argues that the decisions to set up
such a commission and the rules under which it will operate should proceed not from political com-
promises, but from legal principles and historic experience. Dugard, supra note 26, at 287. Dugard
makes a strong, but ultimately unconvincing argument-unconvincing because the problem of what
to do about past public crimes is eminently political in Aristotle's sense of the word. The real ques-
tions center around the issues of what compromises should be accepted.
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likely to cause the slaughter civil war could have wreaked when the old
officials fully controlled the state's instruments.41
A dogging practical question that leaders of a fledgling constitu-
tional democracy must face is whether criminal prosecutions will accel-
erate or slow reconciliation, bringing the citizens of a new constitutional
democracy together into a just society. To what extent would establish-
ment of a truth and reconciliation commission facilitate or impede that
process? Forgoing the sweetness of retaliation against predators can be a
cost worth paying.
On the other hand, the quality of mercy has often been strained,
Portia to the contrary notwithstanding. The case for amnesty, conditional
or absolute, may not be convincing. The new government might be able
to follow a punitive policy, assuming its officials, again operating under
conditions of imperfect knowledge, correctly judge such a course pru-
dent. Important here will be considerations of whom the old regime, if
only virtually, represented. If the rulers constituted a rather small group,
say a clique of military officers who had managed to come to power by
controlling the military and security forces, then perhaps imprisoning or
executing them and their principal henchmen might not produce endur-
ing social disruptions. If, however, as in the remnants of old Yugoslavia,
South Africa, or Rwanda, those responsible for criminal atrocities were
representative of a larger social or ethnic group, or were so perceived by
large segments of such a group, then the result might tear the nation
apart, beyond the power of the current or even the next generation to
stitch together. If such leaders were to be punished, any hope for restored
social unity would allow punishment only by outside force, as actually
happened to many leaders who organized massacres in the Balkan wars
of the 1980s and 1990s.
The new government might find it perilous to offer amnesty if the
popular demand for revenge were so strong that the alternative to crimi-
nal trials was widespread private vengeance. Mob rule is more likely to
provoke anarchy (and perhaps make another coup welcome) than it is to
further any system of civil governance. There are no assurances that the
new government could control its people, punish the oppressors, or even
remain in power. Older Europeans had vivid memories of mobs battling
in the streets of Weimar Germany and the political system that resulted
from public yearnings for order. A dismal drama may well play out:
lynchings followed by preventive indictments, which incite mobs and
41. Even so, the dangers might not be trivial. In South Africa, Archbishop Desmond Tutu
warned his countrymen that many true believers in apartheid "are still in the security forces and part
of the civil service. These people have the capacity of destroying this land.... If there were not the
possibility of amnesty, then the option of a military upheaval [would be] a very real one." Amy
Guttman & Dennis Thompson, The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE:
THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 22, 39 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000)
(internal quotations omitted).
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mutinies, which lead to a coup and a return to authoritarian government.
Fearing these kinds of effects, the new leaders might refuse to agree to
blanket amnesty or, having so agreed, renege on their promise. A clever
casuist (or an ordinary attorney) could construct a plausible argument
that neither murderers nor torturers have a right to the truth, or that the
promise of amnesty was made under duress. In either situation, so a wily
casuist could contend, breaking a promise made to criminals does not
really constitute lying.
Whatever the outcome, a cry for revenge is a typical human reaction
to cruel rule. One moral theologian has compared the driving force of
righteous indignation to that of sex.42 Individual men and women may
believe that keeping faith with their dead and wounded requires retalia-
tion in kind, and most legal systems incorporate an understanding both of
this felt individual need to strike back and a social need for the state to
control vengeance. Islamic law, the shari'a, clearly recognizes retalia-
tion, allowing, for instance, relatives of a murdered man to serve as exe-
cutioners for the government.43 (More civilized American states merely
permit relatives to witness the prisoner's final writhing.) More subtly, the
civil and common law also acknowledge a legitimate role for revenge in
the operations of criminal processes. Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
the Archangel of Legal Realism, claimed "not only that the law does, but
that it ought to, make the gratification of revenge an object."44 He then
went on to quote Sir James Stephen: "The criminal law stands to the pas-
sion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appe-
tite.",45 Three-quarters of a century later, a former Lord Chief Justice of
the United Kingdom told the House of Lords that it was "praiseworthy
that the country should be willing to avenge crime.
46
III. JUSTICE AND PRUDENCE: A CLASH OF VIRTUES?
In the years immediately before and after a constitutional democ-
racy replaces a brutal authoritarian regime, justice and prudence may
seem to make competing, even conflicting, demands. Let us begin by
eliminating two relatively easy problems. First is the justice in punishing
the predators who had been operating an oppressive regime. It could
42. JAMES TUNSTEAD BURTCHAELL, PHILEMON'S PROBLEM: THE DAILY DILEMMA OF THE
CHRISTIAN 102 (1973).
43. Islam does not distinguish between church and state in a fashion comparable to that of
western nations. Therefore, the shari'a is both religious, and where adopted by civil authority (usu-
ally in a modified form), secular law. Over the centuries, Islamic jurists/moral theologians have
deduced the shari'a's precepts from sacred texts and scholarly commentaries. Thus, this body of law
is derivative and even more "unwritten" than the common law was during its early centuries. Never-
theless, many, perhaps most, devout Muslims consider it morally binding.
44. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap
Press 1963) (1881).
45. Id. Holmes was a bachelor when he quoted Stephen.
46. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 61 (1963) (internal quotations omitted)
(discussing capital punishment-he approved).
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hardly be unjust for the new regime to hold these people to account un-
der the criminal law, assuming they were accorded the functional equiva-
lent of due process. The argument would run along such lines as: These
officials seized or accepted power and claimed to act in the name of the
nation and for the good of that nation and its citizens/denizens. Having
reaped the rewards of the power their offices bestowed, they assumed an
obligation to govern for the benefit of their people. It is hardly unfair that
they pay for abuses of power so gross that they are major felonies under
the laws of all civilized states.
A second easy problem concerns a decision not to punish the tyrants
who are willing to surrender the governmental apparatus controlling the
military and internal security forces, only on the condition of being ex-
cused from punishment. The previous section dealt with these issues. We
need only add that new leaders would exchange what they do not have,
the power to punish, for what they also do not (yet) have, the power to
help build decent lives for their fellow citizens. Far from Faustian, this
bargain would promote justice by facilitating the creation of a civil soci-
ety. Even Diane F. Orentlicher, who constructs a very careful argument
that an assortment of international agreements imposes a duty on succes-
sor governments to prosecute tyrants,47 concedes that "international law
does not require governments to commit political suicide. ' '4
The truly difficult moral question is whether justice imposes on a
constitutional democracy a moral obligation to punish the criminals who
ran the old regime. To address that issue, let us first assume that leaders
who wish to peacefully change political systems and stabilize the new
constitutional democracy decide it is prudent to negotiate absolute or
conditional amnesty for the chiefs of the old regime and their henchmen.
Even granting this assumption, Guttman and Thompson assert, the "sta-
bility of a political regime itself is not a moral good or a sufficient reason
to sacrifice justice for individuals." 49 The Final Report of South Africa's
Truth and Reconciliation commission expressed a similar concern, not-
ing that victims of apartheid voiced a common refrain: "We've heard the
truth. There is even talk about reconciliation. But where's the justice?" 50
47. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 26.
48. Diane F. Orentlicher, A Reply to Professor Nino, 100 YALE L.J. 2641, 2641 (1991).
49. Guttman & Thompson, supra note 41, at 23. Similarly, when Charles Taylor, the some-
time President-Dictator of Liberia who had been brutally fighting efforts to depose him and had been
indicted for terrorist acts by Sierra Leone, was allowed to go peacefully (and splendidly) into exile in
Nigeria, two journalists protested, "Peace cannot be bought at the price of justice." Donna E. Arzt &
Lucille M. Rignanese, West Lets Liberia's Taylor Escape, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Aug. 8, 2003.
Alas, peace has often been bought at the cost ofjustice-and every other virtue, for that matter.
50. 1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 104 (2d ed.
1999) (internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter TRC REPORT]. For an excellent discussion, see
Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative
Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 68 (Robert 1. Rotberg &
Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
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At the heart of most of the moral arguments for the necessity of
punishment lies a belief that punishing criminals is essential to victims'
realizing justice. This assumption seems to underlie what Guttman and
Thompson, as well as millions of less learned people, feel. The claim
would have to be that retributive justice is a victim's right, a claim that
would surely be emotionally gratifying to those who suffered from the
old regime's brutalities. There are three bases for such a belief: Victims
have a right grounded in (1) the positive law of the state; (2) international
law; or (3) justice itself.
A. Positive Law
An argument from positive law is that victims have a right, which
the state has implicitly or explicitly contracted to enforce, that public
officials who viciously abuse their fellow nationals be punished. In some
legal systems victims may, in fact, have some such positive legal right.
Certainly, in countries that apply the shari'a, a man (less probably, a
woman) would have a right to take private action, including killing a
family member, usually a woman, who has offended the family's honor.
Furthermore, as we have seen, members of a victim's family have a right
to participate in executing a murderer. It is significant, however, that the
putative right here runs only against other private citizens/denizens. In
most Islamic countries, individuals have as little as three remedies
against abusive officials: (1) informal political pressure exerted through
an influential patron; (2) assassination; or (3) joining a terrorist or revo-
lutionary organization.5 1
Both the civil and common law, as Holmes explained, recognize a
human inclination toward retaliation. Because outside of Africa and
Latin America these two legal systems operate in (sometimes struggling)
representative or constitutional democracies, they allow aggrieved citi-
zens significant political remedies that encourage officials to pursue
criminal charges. Nevertheless, these two legal systems substitute state
action for private retaliation. Civil suits, perhaps including petitions for
injunctions and challenges to the basic constitutionality of the official's
action, are the principal legal remedies. On the one hand, constitutional
democracies deny private citizens a right to exact personal vengeance
and also restrict the capacity of individual citizens to institute criminal
proceedings. The rationale for state-imposed punishment, Carlos S. Nino
argued, is not based on a "recognition that the victims or their relatives
have a right to that punishment., 5 2 Instead, "[i]t is the consequence of a
51. Pakistan occasionally had a form of judicial review, and several Arab countries, most
notably Egypt, have the beginnings of such an institutional arrangement. So far, however, no consti-
tutional court has intervened to try to block official policies that utilize such methods as arbitrary
imprisonment or torture. For an analysis of the real, but fragile, growth of constitutionalism in the
Arab world, see NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB
BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT (2002).
52. Nino, supra note 31, at 2621.
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In many countries, international law may provide another remedy.
Citing numerous international agreements, judicial opinions, and memo-
randa by international commissions, Orentlichter makes an eloquent ar-
gument that international agreements obligate successor governments to
punish the people who organized and commanded systematic atrocities.54
Two points detract from her conclusion. First, these agreements have
loopholes that allow signatories some, if limited, discretion. Second, and
more importantly, a decision to prosecute for a high crime against the
state is essentially a political, not merely a legal, matter. It is political,
not in the journalistic usage of the term as referring to things petty, parti-
san, or expedient, but in the Aristotelian sense of politics as most truly
the master art, being concerned with virtue above all things, in an effort
to make citizens good and obedient to the laws.55 Politics, thus under-
stood, looks to the long and short term good of citizens, which often lies
beyond satisfying immediate desires. Enhancing the chances of citizens
to live free and decent lives must take precedence over punishing crimi-
nals, however gratifying such punishment may be. Distinguishing be-
tween what is merely expedient and what is necessary is, again, a matter
of practical judgment.
C. The Basic Concept of Justice
The third basis for what Nino called "mandatory retribution" is jus-
tice itself.56 Defining this notion is a necessary first step toward discover-
ing its demands. The answer to the question, "What is justice?" is hardly
self-evident. Even Socrates was better at exploding false understandings
of the concept than in exposing its true essence.57 For public officials and
political theorists who are pure pragmatists or consequentialists, 58 the
53. Id. In distinguishing between "rights established by principles and collective goals im-
posed by policies," id., Nino was following RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100
(1977).
54. Orentlicher, supra note 26, at 2612-13.
55. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 95-6, Bk. I, ch. 2, 1094b, ch. 13, 1002a (Christopher
Rowe, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ETHICS].
56. Nino, supra note 31, at 2620.
57. Socrates's claim that only the just man is happy, does not, I believe, entitle one to con-
clude, as Hans Kelsen did, that Socrates equated justice and happiness. See HANS KELSEN, What Is
Justice?, in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 1, 2
(1971).
58. The philosophy (or philosophies) of pragmatism, as formulated somewhat differently by
Williams James (a psychologist of sorts) and Charles Peirce (a mathematician of sorts), is complex,
based on a metaphysics and epistemology that challenged traditional thought of the late nineteenth
century. Its overriding concern for consequences originated, bo Peirce believed, in Kant's assertion
that once "an end is proposed, then the conditions for attaining it are hypothetically necessary."
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 686 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood trans. & eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). For good introductory essays, see Louis MENAND, THE
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question of justice is much less important than whether policies of am-
nesty or criminal prosecution would produce the desired goal(s), which
in this context mean furthering the peaceful transition and political stabil-
ity of a constitutional democracy. In fact, the question of justice is one
that a consistent pragmatist or consequentialist would consider trivial
unless he or she believed that other significant political actors would use
it to stir up public opposition. The solution would then be to give enough
lip service to the prevalent conception of justice, whatever it might be, to
weaken opponents. It is, however, difficult to find a pure pragmatist or
consequentialist in the real world. Even Judge Richard A. Posner is not
always doctrinally orthodox, though he comes close to being what Max
Weber termed an "ideal type."59 It is equally, if not more difficult, to find
someone who is totally indifferent to the effects of decisions. Indeed, it is
almost impossible to conceive of a system of morality that did not factor
likely effects into its calculus. Thus, almost every decision maker is
pragmatic in the limited sense of being seriously concerned about conse-
quences.
For intellectually consistent moral relativists (i.e., moral conven-
tionalists), the task of defining justice should not pose moral or philoso-
phical problems much more difficult than what pragmatists would face.
Moral relativism denies that universal standards of morality or justice
exist or, if they do exist, they are not demonstrable. (An offshoot of this
belief is that all values are equal-itself a value judgment-and therefore
clashes among them are not resolvable through intellectual analyses.)
Because, so says the relativist, judgments about justice and morality are
either idiosyncratic or culture-bound, the most a government need do to
settle the legitimacy of an agreement with exiting officials is to discover
what constitutes "a moral good" or "justice" according to the particular
standards and conventions dominant within a particular community at a
METAPHYSICAL CLUB 201-34, 337-76 (2001); and HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN
MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880'S, at 91-107
(1950). In its extreme form, consequentialism, a close ally of pragmatism, also looks primarily to
results: The end justifies, if not any means, certainly almost any. Judge Richard A. Posner tries to
distinguish pragmatism and consequentialism, at least in the context of adjudication. RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59-71 (2003). Posner states: "I do not know of any
pragmatists who have considered themselves consequentialists, but two notable precursors, Bentham
and John Stuart Mill, did, and there is no doubt that pragmatism is closer to consequentialism than it
is to deontology (duty-based as distinct from consequence-based ethics)." Id. at 65.
59. Indeed, it is doubtful that anyone can be a consistent pragmatist or consequentialist, at
least insofar as these "philosophies" would not use moral considerations in decision making. The
essential difficulty in using results as the criterion of choice is that one must still evaluate results by
some standard. Posner, for example, wants to maximize economic efficiency. But why? There are
competing values. One has to give convincing reasons why an individual or a society should prefer
economic efficiency over other values or would be better off by opting for economic efficiency--or
any of its competitors. Offering economic efficiency itself as the reason would be circular. It remains
unclear how a pragmatist can, with intellectual consistency, justify any particular goal. For a some-
what similar critique, see Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1447 (1990) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990)).
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particular time. For example, if an overwhelming majority of the people
in an Islamic society accept the shari'a and deem it a grievous moral
wrong for an infidel to convert a Muslim to another religion, an intellec-
tually consistent relativist would have to concede that an agreement giv-
ing amnesty to old rulers who had rigidly enforced the shari'a's prescrip-
tion of death for such deeds60 is not unjust for that society. Quite the con-
trary, punishing these rulers would be unjust. For moral relativists, free-
dom of religion, as well as other "rights," such as the equality of men and
women, can only be conventions. In addition, the reach, content, and
authority of mere conventions vary from society to society.
To be sure, determining what data are relevant, then gathering and
analyzing them, can present enormous difficulties. These, however, are
largely problems for experts in such fields as political sociology, polling
public opinion, and quantitative analysis. Except insofar as the method-
ology of the social sciences raises epistemological issues, moral relativ-
ism can have little to say that is interesting or fundamentally important
about justice as a concept. In effect, moral relativism transforms issues of
morality into empirical questions about the customs, attitudes, and opin-
ions that prevail in a given society at a given time. In this analytical con-
text, Guttman and Thompson could be correct. If the moral opinion
dominant in South Africa was that it was unjust to give conditional am-
nesty to officials who viciously enforced apartheid, then the govern-
ment's so acting was, by definition, unjust.
61
For certain kinds of analytical jurisprudence, the problem is even
easier than for its kissing cousin, moral relativism. Justice, according to
modem legal positivism's prophet, Hans Kelsen, "is not ascertainable by
rational knowledge at all .... Justice is an irrational ideal. 62 By "irra-
tional," Kelsen meant that justice is one of society's more or less arbi-
trary choices among values, rather than a conclusion that can be justified
by tightly logical deductions from lexically prior principles or induced
from empirical evidence according to the commands and procedure
specified by what he calls "the basic norm. ' '63 For a consistent positivist,
60. Deuteronomy 13:9-10, commanded a person who was tempted by another Israelite to
worship false gods to identify the tempter, even if a brother or son, and have him stoned to death.
61. Gutmann and Thompson explicitly refer to punishment as being necessary to "criminal
justice as it is commonly understood." Guttman & Thompson, supra note 41, at 25. They do not
specify whether this common understanding is that of South Africa alone, or, rather, that of most or
some nations. They are probably right that this is the common understanding of all nations, although
they offer no data. The data that Gibson reports in OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH
RECONCILE A DIVIDED NATION?, supra note 13, and as Gibson and Gouws report in OVERCOMING
INTOLERANCE N SOUTH AFRICA: EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC PERSUASION, supra note 16,
neither demonstrate nor deny the existence of a dominant moral judgment that amnesty was unjust.
62. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law. Its Method and Fundamental Concepts., 50 LAW
Q. REV. 474, 482 (1934) (Charles H. Wilson trans.).
63. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945). For an heroic effort to restate (and rescue) legal positivism, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998). Sebok's excellent book discusses justice only
indirectly, however, and the word justice does not even appear in the index.
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there can be only particular justice for a particular legal system. What the
law says is just is to be treated as just, at least within that jurisdiction at
that time. Res ipsa loquitur: The "thing," the nation's law, speaks for
itself, and its word is final. If the explicit terms of relevant statutes do not
provide a determinate answer, careful analysis should do so.
Of course, doctrinal chastity no more estops legal positivists from
having a deep concern for justice within any given legal system than
moral relativism prevents conventionalists from being concerned about
how their own society practices its values.64 Analytical jurisprudes such
as H.L.A. Hart have been very sensitive about justice within common
law systems, especially about what they call "formal justice," the rules
that judges should apply and how they should find those rules.65 In fact,
one serious legal scholar claims that Hart's brand of legal positivism is
not incompatible with the universalism of natural law: Hart and his col-
leagues merely ask questions different from those that moral realists or
natural-law theorists would pose.66
Yet, other people manage to proclaim universal moral truths on is-
sues dear to them while asserting moral relativism on lesser matters. On
the one hand, they reject the possibility of universalistic moral judg-
ments; on the other, they pay tribute to certain rights they baptize as
"human." 67 The most famous effort of the twentieth century to make
sense of such a bifurcation was John Rawls's restatement of the theory of
social contract.68 As he used the term, justice equals fairness, a usage that
comes close to Aristotle's equating "the just" with "the lawful and the
fair., 6 9 Despite this venerable intellectual provenance, fairness carries its
64. A moral relativist might apply Kelsen's methodology and try to arrange a society's values
in hierarchical order and argue that endorsement of a basic value, for example, human equality,
logically requires that society to accept derivative values, such as sexual and racial equality. To the
extent that the mass of that society also accepts logical consistency as a value, such an argument
could both fit within moral relativism's parameters and even convince others. It is, however, also
possible that most members of a society are perfectly willing to accept exceptions to their general
principles or to interpret those principles in particularistic ways. For instance, a society may construe
"all men are created equal" to mean "all white males are created equal." If, however, that society
accepts the exceptions or particularistic interpretations----"facts" not always any more easy to estab-
lish than that the society truly accepts the general principle-then a consistent moral relativist must
also accept the exceptions and/or interpretations. Relativists deny the existence of universal moral
principles that trump a society's conventions.
65. See inter alia, H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); HART, supra note 46; see also B.
E. King, The Basic Concept of Professor Hart's Jurisprudence: The Norm out of the Bottle, 1963
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 270; NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
66. ROBERT N. MOLES, DEFINrrION AND RULE IN LEGAL THEORY: A REASSESSMENT OF
H.L.A. HART AND THE POSITIvIST TRADITION (1987). Moles believes that Hart and Ronald Dworkin
were unaware of the absence of conflict because they did not understand the history of legal theoriz-
ing.
67. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
68. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
69. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 55, at 158-59, Bk. V, ch. 1, 1129a-b.
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own ambiguity.7 ° In addition, Rawls's description of the original position
carefully, perhaps wisely, and surely deliberately, excluded from discus-
sion of the background of his fictional social covenant one of the most
basic moral issues: Do "normal" humans possess an innate capacity to
reason about the nature of good and evil-a capacity that would precede,
make possible, and shape the content of an original covenant? In any
event, Rawls used as a model "the original position" in which people
operating under a "veil of ignorance" manage to agree on a set of basic
(constitutional) rules for a "well-ordered society., 71 Not knowing who
they will be in the new society, rich or poor, male or female, white,
brown, or yellow, they seek rules that are just in the sense of being fair to
all members of society.72
Rawls makes much of justice's requiring reciprocity. Justice as re-
ciprocal fairness does carry more intuitive meaning than justice simply as
fairness. Aristotle's notion of justice as proportionality fits that intuition.
Moreover, the Philosopher says, justice differs from the other virtues in
that it is concerned with the good of other people. Thomists, philosophic
disciples, though seldom blind followers of Thomas Aquinas, tend to
agree.73 John Finnis understands Aquinas's conception of justice as
meaning that a person is ready to give to others what is theirs. The diffi-
cult questions center around what belongs to whom, as Socrates, Aris-
totle, Aquinas, and Rawls, among others, recognized.74
70. Judge Richard A. Posner complains that "[tihe problem with words like 'fairness' and
'equality' is that they have no definite meaning." POSNER, supra note 58, at 66.
71. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 68, at 136-42, 448.
72. Although, when discussing economic justice, Rawls specifies that his "founders" do not
know if they will be rich or poor in the society to come, when discussing abortion, he does not use
the veil of ignorance. Rather, he analyzes the issue as arising among people who are already born.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 68, at 243 n.32. It would seem that: (1) Questions about
the value of human life and when it begins are more politically (and morally) significant than alloca-
tions of property; and, therefore, (2) the veil of ignorance should obscure the vision of decision
makers so that, when constructing their basic constitutional order, none of them would not know
whether he or she would be among the born or the aborted. It is probable, however, that ringing
down that veil would have given an answer different from the one that Rawls preferred. Here he was
more a partisan of a specific policy than a detached political philosopher offering a general method
of constructing a just society.
73. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 133 (1980)
[hereinafter FINNIS, AQUINAS].
74. Kelsen claimed this definition "is an empty formula, because the decisive question, what
is that which is everybody's own, is not answered .. " KELSEN, supra note 57, at 13. On this point,
Kelsen's reading was either less than careful, or less than honest. Some two millennia earlier, Socra-
tes had addressed this very difficulty. When Polemarchus quoted Siminodes's definition as "to pay
everyone what is owed to him," Socrates replied: "Simonides is a wise and inspired man.... But
what on earth does he mean by [that]?" PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 6, Bk I, 331:e (Tom Griffith trans.,
G. R. F. Ferrari ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). Aristotle, Aquinas, and modem Thomists have
spent a great deal of time and effort trying to demonstrate how a broad concept of justice applies to
specific situations in real life. In fact, it would be just to characterize these writers as treating justice
less as a general concept and more as a carefully developed attitude reflected in habit. For all of his
brilliance, Kelsen was not above creating and then attacking straw men. See generally Robert P.
George, Kelsen and Aquinas on "'The Natural-Law Doctrine," 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1625
(2000), in which George juxtaposes what Kelsen claimed Aquinas said and what Aquinas actually
said. The result does not flatter Kelsen's scholarly integrity. See supra note 58, for a discussion of
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Public officials and political theorists who are not pragmatists,
moral relativists, or legal positivists, and who differentiate themselves
from Rawls, confront very complex sets of philosophical issues that defy
easy solutions. Their analyses move beyond cultural, geographic, and
temporal boundaries in an attempt to determine if a putative moral good
is indeed good under universally applicable standards. Thomists are the
usual suspects here, although hardly the only culprits.75 They speak of
certain actions that are bad in themselves, regardless of actors' motives
or the specific circumstances surrounding the choice. 76 Thus, contradict-
ing consequentialists and pragmatists, but following Paul of Tarsus, they
deny that a good end, even if pursued for the most noble of motives, can
justify any means; rather, only those means are justified that are them-
selves either good or morally indifferent. Carefully derived predictions
about the results of an action, whether in the long or short term, are im-
portant elements in moral choice. Nevertheless, good results cannot jus-
tify an act such as the deliberate taking of innocent life, itself an evil.
Thomists also differentiate between those things that are good in
themselves and those that are instrumentally good.77 As means to other
ends, these latter take their moral stamp from the character of their
ends.78 The first argument, that good ends do not justify evil means, has
Kelsen's spurious argument that Socrates's (Plato's) claim that only the just man can be happy
meant that Socrates equated justice and happiness. For a more favorable, though not entirely uncriti-
cal, evaluation of Kelsen's general theory, see POSNER, supra note 58, at ch. 7.
75. Leo Strauss was a bitter enemy of moral relativism and legal positivism, which explains
why he counted Hans Kelsen, a fellow refugee from Hitler, among his chief intellectual enemies.
Strauss, however, disclaimed belief in Thomistic natural law. See LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT
AND HISTORY (1953). In his seminars, he repeatedly asserted that the first step toward philosophy
was to distinguish between one's own benefit and the good. See also the writings of the so-called
moral realists, especially: Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277 (1985); Michael S. Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 453 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)); Michael S.
Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992); Sotirios A. Barber, Judge Bork's
Constitution, in COURTS, JUDGES, & POLITICS 641 (4th ed., Walter F. Murphy & C. Herman Pritch-
ett eds., 1986); Sotirios A. Barber, The New Right Assault on Moral Inquiry in Constitutional Law,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253 (1986); Sotirios A. Barber, Epistemological Skepticism, Hobbesian
Natural Right and Judicial Self-Restraint, 48 REV. POL. 374 (1986). For a critical, but not hostile,
analysis of Barber's thesis, see Stanley C. Brubaker, Book Review, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 261 (1985)
(reviewing SOTIRIOS BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984)). Hadley Arkes takes a
position quite similar to that of the moral realists. HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE (1986).
76. Nevertheless, for a Thomist, specific circumstances are important. One example of what
he would consider an evil act under all circumstances is the wanton taking of human life. But, he
would also argue, one must know the context of the act to decide whether the killing was wanton, in
self-defense, or in defense of another (and innocent) human being.
77. See, e.g., FINNIS, AQUINAS, supra note 73, at 86-90; ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN
MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 8-18 (1993); ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF
NATURAL LAW ch. 2 (1999). Aristotle, of course, made a similar distinction. Because he was not a
moral theologian, he did not make as much of the point as did Aquinas and his followers. See
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 55, at 95, Bk. I, ch. 2, 1094a.
78. I deliberately exclude discussion of motives. Like the road to hell, the path to vicious
tyranny is paved with good intentions. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for example, said that despite the
evils of apartheid, some of the Afrikaner officials "genuinely believed" that this policy offered "the
best solution to the complexities of a multiracial land... " TRC REPORT, supra note 50, at 14
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obvious relevance to political morality and resonates well with constitu-
tional democracy, for much of constitutionalism is concerned with regu-
lating, even prohibiting, certain means, such as bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws, even when directed to laudable goals. The second argu-
ment, about the distinction between things good in themselves and
merely instrumental goods, is somewhat less valuable for analyses of the
justice of granting amnesty to vicious felons because the question centers
on instrumental goods-the policies made by governmental institutions,
processes, and policies. These are designed to accomplish certain ends,
and so are morally colorable according to the goals sought and the means
employed. In the latter choices, the notion of actions evil in themselves
becomes relevant.
Even constitutional democracy itself is only an instrumental good.
As with any political system, its goodness depends, as Aristotle would
have put it, on the extent to which the goals it pursues and the means it
utilizes maximize the chances for its citizens to live decent lives. 79 Obvi-
ously, a political system that tries to respect the great and equal dignity
of every human being, as constitutional democracy claims to, is not evil
in itself. Insofar as the regime's policies conform to its preachments, it is
a positive good. Alas, no constitutional democracy always lives up to its
own standards. Thus, political stability would enhance such a regime's
capacity to do good; but, in a flawed world, it might also enhance the
political system's capacity to do evil.
IV. JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT
We have danced around, rather than answered, except for pragma-
tism, moral relativism, and Kelsen's classic legal positivism, the question
whether justice, or more broadly, basic morality, mandates punishment
for tyrants. An affirmation of that demand threatens to legitimize state-
imposed vengeance, and most, though hardly all moralists argue against
the propriety of revenge. As a practical political matter, the consequences
of revenge will differ, as we have seen, between situations in which the
old officials form a relatively small coterie of thugs and those in which,
while still thugs, seem to represent a large ethnic group or social class.
In the second situation, it is highly unlikely that vengeance will heal
social wounds. It is more likely to breed hatred and incite counter-
revenge, starting, as Martin Luther King said, a society onto a downward
spiral toward darkness. Giving back harm for harm certainly establishes
a reciprocal relationship, but whether tit-for-tat heals is doubtful, as Ro-
(foreword by Chairperson D.M. Tutu). Similarly, no one doubts that Adolf Hitler thought the world
would be a better place if every Jew were dead.
79. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 307 (James Madison) ("It is too early for politicians to
presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is
the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than
as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object.").
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80meo and Juliet attested. Moreover, nothing in the history of violence
and counter-violence between Catholics and Protestants in Ulster, be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians, or among various ethnic groups in the
Balkans indicates a therapeutic effect. Nevertheless, strong themes in
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theology, which still provide the founda-
tions of much of modern morality, even among non-believers, make pre-
cisely the argument that God does, and man should, punish all wrongdo-
ing.81 Leviticus and Deuteronomy command Israel to put to death kid-
nappers, perjurers, and those who commit adultery, sodomy, incest,
homicide, or have sex with animals, gather wood on the Sabbath, or
curse either of their parents. These capital crimes include both sins
against Yahweh and violations of the persons or property of other hu-
mans. The basic principle of the civil and criminal law of ancient Israel
was simple and direct:
When one man strikes and disfigures his fellow-countryman, it shall
be done to him as he has done; fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth
for tooth; the injury that he inflicted upon another shall be inflicted
upon him. Whoever strikes a beast and kills him shall make restitu-
tion; but whoever strikes a man and kills him shall be put to death.
82
The same sort of retaliatory theme was echoed in the oft-repeated bibli-
cal refrain of national survival. This chorus had five stages that varied
only in detail: Israel sins, suffers, does penance, is forgiven, and lastly is
liberated, its redemption confirmed by a new covenant. All is well for a
short time, but sin quickly re-ignites the cycle.
Most ominously, on occasion Yahweh might even punish sinners
after He had apparently forgiven them. According to 2 Samuel, for in-
stance, David confessed to the Prophet Nathan that he had Uriah the Hit-
tite slain so that he could add Bathsheba, Uriah's wife, to his own stable.
Nathan replied: "Yahweh, for His part, forgives your sin; you are not to
die. Yet because you have outraged Yahweh by doing this, the [first]
child that will be born to you [and Bathsheba] is to die. 83 This passage
80. Theorists of rational choice may differ, arguing that rational actors are likely to prefer
some sort of compromise to the destructiveness of endless retaliation and counter-retaliation. Among
the best works here is, ROBERT AXELROD. THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). There are two
general difficulties--though less so with Axelrod's book than most such studies. The first is the
simple fact that people do not always behave rationally or even intelligently-a difficulty especially
large when, as immediately after liberation from brutal rule, emotions are likely to run high. The
second difficulty is that, in order to understand what political actors deem rational, one has to know
their hierarchy of values. During the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara began bombing
Ho Chi Minh's small factories in an effort to persuade him to stop his campaign against South Viet-
nam. Minh, a former peasant, did not value factories in the same way as did McNamara, the former
President of Ford Motor Company. As a result, the North's incentive to compromise was far weaker
than McNamara had supposed.
81. For God, at least, the data are weak. In this world, punishment that we can ascribe, albeit
with small confidence, to the Deity seems random.
82. Leviticus 24:17-21.
83. 2 Samuel 12:13-14.
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also provides a concrete example of Yahweh's wrath extending beyond
the current generation. The author of 2 Samuel does not speak of any sin
committed by the child Bathsheba was carrying. 84 "Fearing" the rage of
this "great and terrible" God was prudent indeed.
The standard Christian story of salvation conveys a similar message
of justice as retribution: God demands that mankind expiate sin through
suffering. Sinners are not forgiven through contrition alone. Only the
agony of a sacrificial Lamb's slow, asphyxiating, death on a cross could
satisfy divine justice after Adam and Eve's disobedience. The point of
Jesus's death was to change God, not man.85 Operating within this para-
digm, Augustine saw punishment and justice as reciprocal and God as a
heavenly Rottweiler, ever waiting to pounce on those who violate His
laws. To support his speculations, the holy bishop quoted the sixth chap-
ter of Luke's gospel: "With the same measure that ye mete withal it shall
be measured to you again? '86 Indeed, Augustine went so far as to say:
"As a rule, just wars are defined as those which avenge injuries, if some
nation or state.., has neglected to punish a wrong committed by its citi-
zens, or to reclaim something that was wrongfully taken. 87 Across a
dozen centuries, Jonathan Edwards, the great American Protestant Di-
vine, echoed Augustine's message about sinners: "[J]ustice calls aloud
for an infinite punishment .... The wrath of God burns against them;
their damnation does not slumber; the pit is prepared; the fire is made
ready; the flames do rage and glow.
88
The shari'a's endorsement of retaliation is directly based, so Is-
lamic jurists aver, on the Qur'an. That collection of Mohammed's saying
sends complex messages of Allah as the all- merciful, both "benign and
forgiving. 89 Still, He accepts repentance "only of those who are guilty of
an evil out of ignorance yet quickly repent . .,90 Islamic jurisprudence
has resolved such ambiguities in favor of vengeance.
To the extent that the Bible, the standard Christian story of salva-
tion, the Qur'an, and shari'a, express the traditional religious thinking of
Jews, Christians, and Muslims, the weight of these moral theologies is
clearly on the side of mandatory punishment. Outside the world of Islam,
the force of these orthodoxies may have weakened over the centuries but
still exert power over many minds. The move from a divine retribution
that imposes eternal damnation as payback for sin, to a necessity that
84. An atheist might construct an alternative hypothesis that is kinder to Yahweh: Bathsheba
had an abortion and the author of 2 Samuel provided a cover story.
85. Burtchaell argues that this account has the story backwards: The real point of Jesus's
death was to change Man, not God. See generally BURTCHAELL, supra note 42, at 79-88 & ch. 4.
86. See generally SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 763, Bk XXI, §§ 11-14 (Marcus
Dods trans., Modem Library 1950).
87. BURTCHAELL, supra note 42, at 191 (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 81.
89. AL-QUR'AN 80, ch. 4, verse 43 (Ahmed Ali trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1988).
90. Id. at 76, ch. 4, verse 17.
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human authorities punish wrongdoing, has been a smooth skate, helping
to cloud distinctions between, on the one hand, vengeance and, on the
other, rehabilitation, deterrence, restoration of individuals' losses, and
repair of damages to the public order. Even assuming what takes a blind
leap of mindless faith to accept, that commentators on these texts have
accurately described their infinitely loving God as a vindictive double-
entry bookkeeper, 91 extrapolating from the supernatural to the mundane
is a dangerous conceit. The commands of Man's justice are murky and
the relationships between sinful humans, punishment, and justice are
labyrinthine, not linear.
Examination of the purposes of punishment might clarify its relation
to justice. Three justifications are generally accepted for inflicting pun-
ishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, and restoration. Socrates emphasized
the rehabilitative function, though he was impressed by Protagoras's
emphasis on deterrence. Using an analogy that both Aristotle and Aqui-
nas 92 would adopt, Socrates compared punishing a person who had
committed a crime to giving medicine to a sick person. It was needed "so
the wrong-doer may suffer and [be] made whole."93 From a different
perspective, the eminent moral theologian, James Tunstead Burtchaell,
speaks of the necessity of penance as the repentant sinner's "celebration
of what God has been forgiving."94 In actual practice, however, the
therapeutic value of punishment for the moral sclerotics who have com-
manded the machinery of brutally authoritarian governments is doubtful.
None of those who ordered or operated the German concentration camps
or Russian gulags, incited the slaughter of the Tutus in Rwanda, or or-
ganized murders for the Argentine or Chilean generals, has publicly of-
fered to do penance.
Furthermore, only rarely have any of these people demonstrated
even a hint of remorse for having committed murder and torture on a
mass scale. According to Mitscherlich and Mielke's analysis of the trials
of the doctors who conducted the Nazis' experiments on live human be-
ings, most of whom pleaded guilty as charged, not one of them said "I
am sorry. ' 9 Even Albert Speer, who is sometimes cited as the one lead-
91. Jewish commentators might respond that much of the work of Talmudists has been di-
rected toward softening the Torah's harsh strictures. Moreover, not all Islamic jurisprudes accept the
dominant interpretations of the shari'a.
92. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 55, at 113, Bk. II, ch. 3, 1104b; I ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I-II, Q. 87, art. 7, at 997 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.,
Benzinger Brothers, Inc. 1947) [hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. For a listing of cita-
tions to other places in which Aquinas used this analogy, see FINNis, AQUINAS, supra note 73, at
212 n.141.
93. PLATO, Gorgias, in 3 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1 (B. Jowett trans., Charles Scribner's
Sons 1911 (1887)).
94. BURTCHAELL, supra note 42, at 333.
95. ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH & FRED MIELKE, DOCTORS OF INFAMY: THE STORY OF THE
NAZI MEDICAL CRIMES 18 (Heinz Norden trans., 1949) (quoted in TZVETAN TODOROv, FACING THE
EXTREME: MORAL LIFE IN THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS 234 (Arthur Denner & Abigail Pollak
trans., 1996)).
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ing Nazi who admitted evildoing, accepted only responsibility for his
actions; he waffled about his own guilt. "It is not only specific faults that
burden my conscience, great as these may have been," he wrote after
twenty years in Spandau Prison. "My moral failure is not a matter of this
item and that; it resides in my active association with the whole course of
events." The expectant reader waits for a mea maxima culpa. Instead, a
sadly inadequate explanation oozes out: Technology made me do it.
"Dazzled by the possibilities of technology, I devoted crucial years of my
life to serving it. But in the end my feelings about it are highly skepti-
cal. 96 And the dog, about whom we should be highly skeptical, ate his
homework.
Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler died without expressing remorse, and
Idi Amin and Leopoldo Galtieri departed equally silent. Agosto Pinochet
slipped into senility urging his former generals to remain loyal to the
cause of anticommunism. In testimony before the TRC, some of South
Africa's former officials did appear contrite, even though the commis-
sion's rules did not require them to do so. One does not, however, have
to be a cynic to doubt the sincerity of defendants who hoped that evi-
dencing sorrow would keep them out of prison. Although Christians be-
lieve repentance, conversion, and redemption are always possible, moral
rehabilitation of deposed despots is not an outcome on which Las Vegas
bookmakers would give odds. Thus, rehabilitative justice for officials of
the old regime remains only a remotely possible, not probable, outcome
of punishment.
Threats of punishment may deter decent people who are disinclined
to commit serious crimes anyway, which is not a small accomplishment,
of course.97 But its capacity to restrain, either psychologically or morally,
career criminals, or the sort of men who operate brutally oppressive gov-
ernments is doubtful. The much publicized trials of war criminals at Nur-
emberg and Tokyo, followed by the execution of most of the defendants,
did not slow, much less stop, Stalin, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Tse Tung,
Idi Amin, Kim il Sung, Kim Jong-il, Slobodan Miloslovic, Saddam Hus-
sein, or any of several dozen Latin American generals and African dicta-
tors from terrorizing their own people. As Reinhold Niebuhr said, "The
96. ALBERT SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH: MEMOIRS 524 (Richard Winston & Clara
Winston trans., 1970). I once shared an editor with Albert Speer. I had remarked that at least Speer
had acknowledged his guilt. Our editor corrected me. In their conversations, Speer had conceded that
the charges against him were true, but, when our editor made the same comment as I, Speer inter-
rupted to say that he accepted responsibility, not guilt.
97. According to the Federalist Society, "of recidivists incarcerated [in state prisons] for a
violent offense, the number with only nonviolent priors actually exceeds the number with a violent
prior. The notion that criminality is neatly segmented into violent and nonviolent is fundamentally
wrong." Federalist Society White Paper, The USA Patriot Act of 2001: Criminal Procedure Sections
16-17 (2001), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/TerrorCrimPro.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2004).
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whip of the law cannot change the heart. 98 Like Mafia Dons, gangsters
who are in power do not believe they will be caught. Often they are right.
Yet, there is always an "on the other hand" in such matters as deter-
rence. Whatever the value of studies of threats of, and actual punishment
on, "ordinary" criminals, the number of coprophagers who have done the
dirty work of authoritarian political systems remains small when com-
pared to mass populations in prisons. That fact may speak well for hu-
man nature but it does prevent statistical analysis on which scholars can
rely. Aryeh Neier, when he was Executive Director of Human Rights
Watch, spoke for "the other hand:" "Who's to say that clemency won't
simply further embolden the torturers, thereby inviting rather than pre-
venting future abuses?"99
Punishment's capacity to affect restorative (corrective) justice is
also problematic."°° Heavy fines, in the unlikely event that the new gov-
ernment could force ousted officials to pay, might compensate for dam-
ages to property.' 0 ' But no punishment can restore the murdered to life.
"My son can rest now," a mother in New Mexico said in 2003 when the
killer was ordered to serve a minimum of thirty years in prison. That
sentence may have quenched the mother's thirst for vengeance, but it is
doubtful that her son knew about it or, if he knew, cared. Not even the
Comanches' practice of skinning prisoners alive, and leaving them to
toast in the desert sun, can restore the murdered to life, or make whole
the numbed minds or crippled bodies of people who have been tortured;
nor can permanently locking a tyrant in a cage give back to those
wrongly incarcerated the lost years of their lives. Time swaps occur only
in science fiction.
Criminal trials may also serve a commemorative function. Stalin al-
legedly said that the death of one man is a tragedy, the slaughter of hun-
dreds of thousands a mere statistic. By allowing victims and their rela-
tives to testify, criminal trials could memorialize those who suffered. No
longer would victims be merely anonymous numbers. They, and their
families, could confront their tormentors in public and tell their stories-
a process that transfigures faceless victims into flesh-and-blood human
beings with personal histories of courageous opposition to oppression.
Even if that testimony does not penetrate the thick armor of their tormen-
tors' moral autism, it can comfort victims, as well as reinforce the revul-
98. BURTCHAELL, supra note 42, at 213 (internal quotations omitted).
99. Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers, in I
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 491, 497
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
100. For "restorative justice," Aristotle employs a term that Richard McKeon, using the Oxford
translation, renders as "rectificatory justice." ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1008 n.6 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
101. For a thorough analysis, see LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETrLING
ACCOUNTS WITH TORTURERS (1990).
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sion that the outside world feels, serving as a reminder, as the perpetra-
tors stand humiliated in the dock, that the face of evil, although always
hideous, is also often ordinary. Moreover, there is something comforting,
perhaps wrongly so, in watching a cruel hunter become the prey. That
scene may also be morally instructive and, in a limited sense, educate the
educable, if not to deter the incorrigible.
On the other hand, testimony before a truth and reconciliation
commission, again, modeled on that of South Africa, might more effec-
tively achieve that commemorative goal. Such an institution can provide
the stage for what Elizabeth Kiss calls "a national morality play.
'10 2 Vic-
tims, or their families, can tell their stories and present their evidence as
coherent packages, rather than in the piecemeal fashion required by the
less flexible rules of a court. "Retrospectively," Lawrence Wechsler con-
cludes, "the broadcasting of truth to a certain extent redeems the suffer-
ing of the former victims. 10 3 More than post-conviction pleadings for a
reduced sentence, the prospect of amnesty could pressure even con-
scienceless pirates to confess their crimes and express remorse. If these
former officials craved absolution, they would be compelled to testify
and then submit to cross-examination. If they did not, they would not be
before the commission. In addition, they would know perjury could re-
sult in double punishment, for the crimes about which they lied, and for
the perjury itself. Although these people, often being psychopaths, sa-
dists, egomaniacs, or all three, would probably not feel any shame, their
publicly expressing contrition would further tar themselves and, more
importantly, the political order that their crimes helped maintain. More-
over, if those seeking amnesty were questioned about the fates of the
thousands of people whom the regime made disappear, the victims' fami-
lies could have whatever the thin comfort closure brings. This sort of
epiphany is not likely to happen in Argentina or Chile.
Possibly the most important result of putting political predators in
prison is to prevent them from again harming fellow citizens. As Niebuhr
completed his thought about "the whip of the law:" "But thank God
[government] can restrain the heartless" until they grow new hearts,
which, in this context probably translates "until death do us part." Re-
moval from office usually prevents tyrants from continuing their oppres-
sion, although nothing less than swift executions, as Nicolai Ceaucescu
and his wife suffered, can guarantee an end to their vicious careers. Ty-
rants have been known to rise from political graves. Executions, how-
ever, may actually help a totalitarian movement by creating martyrs who
might be, as Rosa Luxemburg was, more useful to lost causes than are
live heroes. New leaders might also find it prudent to recall a stanza from
William Blake's "The Grey Monk:"
102. Kiss, supra note 50, at 70.
103. Weschler, supra note 99, at 498.
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The hand of Vengeance found the bed
To which the Purple Tyrant fled;
The iron hand crush'd the Tyrant's head




Punishment's protecting citizens against future harm leads to an-
other function, which Thomists classify as retributive, but might be more
accurately characterized as rehabilitative for the community. Sin, Aqui-
nas argued, disrupts the divine order of things, which only punishment
can restore. 10 5 By analogy, he reasoned that offenses committed by pub-
lic officials disrupt society's order. This "inequality of justice" can only
be rectified by imposing "bads they are unwilling to undergo."'' 0 6 The
purpose of government's inflicting punishment goes beyond paying a
debt to injured individuals; more importantly, it tries to restore (or gener-
ate) harmony for the community. Punishment "is requisite" not only so
the criminal's soul will be healed but also so that
the disorder [in society] may be remedied by the contrary of that
which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore
the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so
that those who were scandalized ... may be edified [instructed and
deterred?] by the punishment .... 107
Seven centuries later, Lord Denning offered a variation on these
themes. "It is a mistake," he wrote to the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, "to consider the object of punishment as being deterrent or
reformative or preventive and nothing else., 108 Punishment's "ultimate
justification," he asserted, consists in its statement of the community's
104. William Blake, The Grey Monk, in POEMS (Dante Gabriel Rossetti ed., 1863).
105. Although I am not sure I would be welcome in the fold, I count myself a Thomist. Never-
theless, I find this argument utterly unconvincing, as I do all arguments that, while accepting God's
omnipotence, try to specify limits on His unlimited and unlimitable power.
106. FINNIS, AQUINAS, supra note 73, at 211-15, espec. n.153, has an excellent analysis of
Thomas's short disquisition on punishment and justice. Throughout this brief discussion, Aquinas's
focus is on sin and the punishment to which he usually refers is that which God (supposedly, because
Thomas offers no data) imposes on sinners. The argument is thus theological, not political. Occa-
sionally, however, Aquinas does include a reference (an aside?) to unjust and criminal acts done to
fellow men and to punishment imposed by rulers. For instance: "This restoration of the equality of
justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men."
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 92, Pt. I-I, Q. 87, art. 6, 977. Aquinas's views on
tyrannicide, even punishing tyrants, are less than clear-in part because he died before completing
De Regimine Principum, the work in which he most thoroughly examined those problems. His
student, Ptolemy of Lucca, finished the essay and it is impossible to say what in that analysis was
written by whom.
107. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 92, Pt. I-Il, Q. 87, art. 6, Reply Obj. 3, 977;
see also id. at Q. 87, art. 2, Reply Obj. 1 ("Sometimes indeed [punishment] is for the good of those
who are punished .... But it is always for the amendment of others, who, seeing some men fall from
sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning."); id. at Q. 87, art. 3, Reply Obj. I ("Even the punishment
that is inflicted according to human laws is not always intended as a remedy for the one who is
punished, but sometimes only for others. Thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own
amendment, but for the sake of others, who at least may be deterred through fear of punishment...
. t).108. HART, supra note 46, at 65.
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"emphatic denunciation" of a crime.1° 9 In a broader sense, of course,
Aquinas and His Lordship were talking about an educative function-the
state's publicly reaffirming its values by imposing severe physical harm
on people who violated those norms. As an educational device, punish-
ment can play an important role for constitutional democracy, instructing
its people about the polity's basic values. Then, so can the hearings and
final report of a truth and justice commission, as earlier paragraphs con-
tend.
CONCLUSION: POLITICS AND JUSTICE
What does this long excursus tell us about justice's demanding pun-
ishment of former officials? The question would not be of much interest
to either pragmatists or consequentionalists. Moral relativists and legal
positivists would defer to either local conventions or the rules of local
legal systems. Augustine and Jonathan Edwards, convinced retribution-
ists, would insist on scourging, imprisoning, or executing deposed ty-
rants. Aquinas, encumbered by a felt obligation to import into politics a
theology that included a vindictive God, would tend to agree, though
with less vehemence and joy. Socrates and Aristotle would prefer but
probably not require punishment. Still, the latter two, and Aquinas as
well, tinctured their public morality with splashes of political realism and
might have been quite willing to compromise. Rawls's theory of justice,
with its heavy infusion of reciprocity, would allow punishment, but it is
not certain that his conception of justice as fairness would demand retri-
bution over amnesty.
There is always the haunting question: How much justice, fairness,
or retribution, do we as individuals really want? When Hamlet asks
Polonius to take care of the actors who will put on the play he wrote to
"catch the conscience of the king," the Chamberlain promises, "My
Lord, I will use them according to their desert."'
10 Hamlet responds:
"God's bodykins, man, much better: use every man after his desert, and
who should 'scape whipping?""' Dante hammered home a similar point:
The most frightening aspect of his Inferno is that each person agonizing
in one of the circles of a horrible Hell is getting exactly what he or she
has earned-not a cheering thought for self-reflective people who are not
blindly self-righteous. Few of us have committed such crimes as mass
rape, torture, or murder. Yet, by acts of omission as well as commission,
most of us have hurt our fellow humans. We have, for example, driven
an automobile too fast or after one or two drinks too many, spoken
thoughtless racial or ethnic slurs, padded an expense account, or failed to
report cash income on tax returns. For any of us to insist on exacting
exact retribution is hazardous. For others, we may demand a strict ac-
109. Id.
110. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1I, Sc. 2.
111. Id.
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counting of wrongdoing, demand punishment, and call that process jus-
tice. For ourselves we prefer a looser conception of justice, one tempered
by mercy.
For pure pragmatists, moral relativists, legal positivists, and, for
very different reasons, retributionists like Augustine, the question of
whether the basic concept of justice requires the new government to pun-
ish the old tyrants is easy. But for those of us who think both that justice
is not an empty word and that it differs from revenge, the problem is
shrouded in mist. Deciding the moral issue is not, however, a hopeless
task, only a very difficult one. Some of that mist may lift with a realiza-
tion that justice has a positive as well as a negative aspect. It is con-
cerned not merely with punishing wrongful actions but also with facili-
tating actions that will build a new life for citizens, actions that will en-
able the members of that society to pursue their own happiness while
respecting the same right of their fellow citizens.
For a new constitutional democracy, there is, the drafters of South
Africa's interim constitutional text of 1993 wrote in the epilogue to that
document, "a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu [humaneness] but not
for victimization."'
' 12
Decisions to prosecute, or to compromise and offer conditional am-
nesty, or even to grant full absolution and attempt "no-fault reconcilia-
tion" are thus eminently political, again in Aristotle's sense. They are
concerned with authoritatively establishing goals for society and deter-
mining the means that are both most efficiently directed toward those
ends and most consonant with the principles of constitutional democracy.
Whatever the choice among kinds of punishment and amnesty, the goal,
at least for men and women who hope to establish a viable polity, must
be reconciliation rather than division. A nation fragmented by hate and
anger is unlikely able to honor norms of constitutional democracy or
even remain at peace with itself. The ideal society for the survival of
constitutional democracy is one in which citizens trust and respect one
another. The minimum condition is a society in which citizens do not
hate and fear one another.
112. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. ch. 16 (1993).
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